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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION
BARRY ROSEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
NETFRONTS, INC., ET AL., 
Defendants.
 ________________________________
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. CV 12-658 CAS (FFMx)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Barry Rosen (“Rosen”) filed the instant action in this Court on January
25, 2012.  Plaintiff’s complaint alleges two claims for copyright infringement.  The
gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that defendant Stephen Pierson (“Pierson”) has,
through his website, attempted to sell four unauthorized prints of photographs taken by
plaintiff (“the Photographs”).1  The Photographs portray actress Gena Lee Nolan, and at
the time defendant was offering them for sale, they were purportedly autographed.  The
1 Rosen’s complaint named Pierson and Netfronts, Inc. as defendants.  Dkt. #1.  On
February 27, 2012, the claims against Netfronts, Inc. were dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to a stipulation.  Dkt. #14.  Pierson is the sole remaining defendant.  
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Photographs were never sold, and the asking price for the Photographs never exceeded
fifty dollars.  Rosen is seeking attorney’s fees, statutory damages, and an injunction.  
On June 13, 2013 the Court held a bench trial.  After considering the evidence and
arguments presented at trial, the Court finds and concludes as follows.  
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff Rosen is a photographer, and has worked in this profession for
several years.  Rosen took the Photographs at issue in this case, and registered them with
the Copyright Office in 2004.  
2. Defendant Pierson is in the business of selling entertainment memorabilia,
including autographed pictures.  For several years, Pierson operated a retail store in Los
Angeles, California.  Additionally, Pierson sold memorabilia by mail and through the
Internet.  
3. At some point during the late 1990s, two men appeared in Pierson’s store,
and sold Pierson several prints, including the Photographs.
4. After purchasing the Photographs, Pierson displayed them and offered them
for sale through his store, through mail-order catalogs, and through the Internet.  The
dispute underlying this case arises out of Pierson’s efforts to sell the Photographs,
Rosen’s efforts to stop Pierson from selling the Photographs, Pierson’s eventual
acquiescence to Rosen’s demands, and Pierson’s avowed efforts to remove his offers to
sell the Photographs from the Internet.  The facts revolve around several encounters
during which Rosen demanded that Pierson cease his activities.  
5. The first such encounter occurred at some point in either the late 1990s or
early 2000s, when Rosen appeared in Pierson’s store.  Upon seeing the Photographs,
Rosen informed Pierson that he owned a copyright to the Photographs, and demanded
that Pierson cease displaying the Photographs and offering them for sale.  Pierson asked
Rosen for proof establishing his ownership of a copyright in the Photographs.  Rosen did
not offer any proof, and left the store.  
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6. A second set of encounters occurred between 2001 – 2004, and involved
Pierson’s attempts to sell the Photographs through the Internet.  On several occasions,
Rosen issued notices, pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §
512 (“DMCA”), demanding that the Photographs be removed from ebay.com and
dejavugalleries.com (“Pierson’s website”), the latter of which was operated by Pierson. 
In 2004, Pierson learned of one of the DMCA notices from Tony Romero (“Romero”),
who was providing technical support to Pierson’s business.  In response to the DMCA
notice, Pierson ceased displaying and offering the Photographs for sale through the
Internet.  Pierson was unsure whether or not he had a right to sell and display the
Photographs, but decided to cease his activity because the Photographs were inexpensive
items.  
7. At some point in 2005, Pierson encountered technical problems with his
website, and removed his business from the Internet.  At this time, Rosen believed
Pierson had ceased doing business.  
8. Although Pierson ceased his efforts to sell the Photographs online in 2004,
he had also displayed one of the Photographs in a mail-order catalog.  Pierson did not
remove the offers to sell this Photograph from the mail order catalogs at that time. 
Accordingly, one of the four Photographs was displayed and offered for sale through the
catalog.  The catalog continued to be published, even after Pierson discontinued his
online business.2  
9. Subsequently, in or around 2010, Pierson revived his online business, and
hired Lin Daniel (“Daniel”) to rebuild his website.  When Daniel rebuilt the website, she
used a “global replace” technique, which drew upon a database Pierson had created that
included information regarding all or almost all of the merchandise he had for sale. 
Although Romero had removed the Photographs from Pierson’s website, they had never
2 It is unclear why Pierson did not remove the Photograph from the catalog, or
whether he even knew that the Photograph was included in the catalog.  
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been removed from this database.  Therefore, when the website was rebuilt, a
consequence of the “global replace” was that the Photographs and offers to sell were
again displayed on Pierson’s website.  Additionally, Pierson’s new website included a
digital version of the print catalog, which still contained a copy of one of the
Photographs and a related offer to sell.  
10. With the Photographs back online, the final set of encounters occurred.  At
some point in 2010, Rosen viewed the Photographs while conducting an Internet search. 
In response, Rosen issued new DMCA notices demanding that the Photographs be taken
down, and demanding that the electronic version of the catalog also be taken down. 
Pierson learned of the DMCA notices, and directed Daniel to remove the Photographs
from the website.  Additionally, Pierson removed the copy of the Photograph from the
electronic version of the catalog, and directed Daniel to replace the allegedly infringing
catalog with the modified catalog.  
11. In response to Pierson’s request, Daniel stated that she would resolve the
problem, and attempted to reprogram the website to ensure that the Photographs would
not reappear.  She did not, however, remove the Photographs from Pierson’s database. 
Instead, she attempted to make the Photographs inaccessible by removing any links to
the Photographs.  She believed that actually removing the images from the database
would have been excessively difficult and not necessary to remove the Photographs from
the website.
12. Rosen was able to view the Photographs online despite Daniel’s
modification to the website, and on September 3, 2011, Rosen sent another DMCA
notice demanding that the images be taken down.  
13. Rosen filed the instant lawsuit on January 25, 2012, alleging that Pierson
engaged in copyright infringement through the website.  Subsequently, in response to the
complaint and DMCA notice, Daniel took additional steps to ensure that the Photographs 
/ / /
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would not reappear, and also removed them from the website’s database.  Since this
lawsuit was filed, the Photographs have not reappeared on Pierson’s website. 
14. To the extent necessary, each of these findings of fact may be deemed to be
a conclusion of law. 
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Rosen has asserted claims for copyright infringement arising out of
Pierson’s post-2010 display of the Photographs and attendant offers of sale.  
2. A copyright infringement claim has two elements: (1) ownership of a valid
copyright, and (2) violation of any of the exclusive rights of copyright owners.  17
U.S.C. § 501; Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004).  Rosen owns a
copyright in the Photographs, and by displaying the Photographs on the Internet along
with offers to sell, Pierson violated Rosen’s exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute
the Photographs.  17 U.S.C. § 106.  While, under some circumstances, the “first sale”
doctrine allows purchasers of authorized individual copies of an image to sell any copies
lawfully purchased, the doctrine is inapplicable here because Pierson presented no
evidence that the prints he sold were authorized copies.  17 U.S.C. § 109(a); Apple, Inc.
v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2011).  Moreover, while the defense of
laches can, under some circumstances, provide a defense to copyright infringement, it is
inapplicable here because the evidence shows that Rosen did not unreasonably delay in
asserting his rights, but instead refrained from bringing a suit earlier because he believed
Pierson had gone out of business.  Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 950 – 951
(9th Cir. 2001) (“To demonstrate laches, the defendant must prove both an unreasonable
delay by the plaintiff and prejudice to itself.”).  
3. Therefore, the Court finds that Pierson infringed Rosen’s copyright in all
four Photographs by posting the Photographs online along with offers to sell.  The Court
next considers what remedies are available to Rosen.  
/ / /
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4. Rosen seeks statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and injunctive relief.  17
U.S.C. §§ 502, 504(c), 505.  In response, Pierson argues that statutory damages are
unavailable under the doctrine of continuing infringement, which bars a copyright
plaintiff from seeking attorney’s fees or statutory damages where the alleged acts of
infringement commenced prior to the registration of the work.  17 U.S.C. § 412(2). 
Additionally, Pierson argues that even if the doctrine of continuing infringement does
not apply, only minimal statutory damages should be awarded because he never intended
to display or offer to sell the Photographs when he resume his online business in 2010.  
5. Under the doctrine of continuing infringement, “the first act of infringement
in a series of ongoing infringements of the same kind marks the commencement of one
continuing infringement under § 412.”  Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528
F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2008).  Here, Pierson’s infringement through the catalog
commenced at least in 2001, and hence commenced prior to registration.  Rosen
therefore cannot pursue statutory damages arising out of the copying and offers of sale
that occurred in connection with Pierson’s catalog.  Rosen can, however, pursue
statutory damages arising out of the copying and offers of sale that occurred through
Pierson’s website.  The doctrine of continuing infringement does not apply to these acts
because Pierson ceased displaying the Photographs through his website between 2005 –
2010, and this cessation of infringing activity renders the defense of continuing
infringement inapplicable to the claims arising out of the website.  Troll Co. v. Uneeda
Doll Co., 483 F.3d 150, 158 – 159 (2d. Cir. 2007); Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc.,
741 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (S.D. Tex. 1990); Singh v. Famous Overseas, Inc., 680 F.
Supp. 533, 535 (E.D. N.Y. 1988).3  
/ / /
3 The infringement through the catalog is irrelevant to the analysis of whether
continuous infringement occurred through Pierson’s website, because those acts of
infringement are not “of the same kind.”  Derek Andrew, Inc., 528 F.3d at 699.  
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6. Rosen may therefore be awarded statutory damages for infringement of
each of the four Photographs.  Statutory damages are awarded based on the number of
works infringed, not the number of infringements that took place.  Walt Disney Co. v.
Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1990).  The standard amount of statutory damages
is $750 – $30,000 per work, but if the infringement was “innocent,” a court may award
damages as low as $200.  Id. §§ 504(c)(1) – (2).  Infringement is innocent if the
“infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an
infringement of copyright.”  Id. § 504(c)(2).  
7. A defendant has the burden of proving innocent infringement, and to carry
this burden, the defendant must show a good faith belief that no infringement occurred,
and must also show that this belief was objectively reasonable.  Childress v. Taylor, 798
F. Supp. 981, 994 (S.D. N.Y. 1992).  In a typical innocent infringement defense, a party
asserts its belief that no infringing act took place because either the infringed works were
not copyrighted, or the acts did not constitute infringement.  See, e.g., id.; D.C. Comics
Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29, 32, 26 (2d Cir. 1990); Allen-Myland, Inc. v.
International Business Machines Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1014, 1027 (E.D. Pa. 1991).  Here,
Pierson offers a slightly different version of the defense.  Rather than attempting to argue
that he was unaware that the Photographs were copyrighted, he argues that he was
unaware that he had actually posted the Photographs online with offers to sell.  Pierson’s
defense therefore does not contest his knowledge of whether the acts constituted
infringement, but instead rests on his assertion that—at the time the infringement
commenced—he had a reasonable belief that he was not engaging in the acts constituting
infringement.  
8. The Court finds that Pierson’s infringement was innocent.  The evidence at
trial showed that Pierson did not personally handle technical duties regarding his
website, but instead retained Romero and Daniel for this purpose.  Moreover, Pierson
consistently directed both Romero and Daniel to remove the Photographs from the
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website upon learning of Rosen’s complaints.  Therefore, Pierson never personally
displayed the Photographs or offers to sell the Photographs on his website, nor did he
direct Romero or Daniel to do so, which supports his contention that he never
subjectively intended to engage in the infringing acts that took place.  
9. Moreover, it was reasonable for Pierson to believe that by bringing his
business back online in 2010, he would not engage in infringement of Rosen’s
copyrights.  Pierson had instructed Romero to remove the Photographs from the website
in or around 2004, and thereby ceased infringing Rosen’s copyrights through his
website.  Accordingly, when he reestablished his online business in 2010, Pierson had no
reason to believe that he would engage in infringing acts by reviving the website. 
Nothing that occurred between 2005 – 2010 raised the possibility that Daniel’s global
replace would reintroduce the Photographs to the website.  Moreover, after learning that
his website had, in fact, displayed the Photographs, Pierson immediately directed Daniel
to modify the website.  While Daniel’s modifications to the website did not successfully
prevent the images from reappearing, the Court has no reason to doubt the
reasonableness of Daniel’s belief that her modifications to the website should have been
sufficient to prevent further infringing acts, nor the reasonableness of Pierson’s belief
that Daniel could successfully prevent the Photographs from reappearing.  The Court
therefore concludes that there are no additional steps a reasonable person in Pierson’s
position would have taken to insure that the Photographs would not reappear online. 
Consequently, Pierson’s infringement was the result of a reasonable mistake, and
therefore Pierson’s infringement was innocent.  Accordingly, given the innocent nature
of the infringement, statutory damages in the amount of $800 are appropriate.  
10. Additionally, because Pierson’s infringement was innocent, Pierson has
ceased any infringing conduct, and Pierson has made good faith attempts to avoid
infringement, the Court finds that Rosen is not entitled to attorney’s fees.  McCulloch v.
Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 323 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Considerations which justify
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the denial of fees may include . . . the defendant’s status as innocent, rather than willful
or knowing, infringer . . . the defendant’s good faith attempt to avoid infringement.”);
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 740 (S.D. N.Y. 1988).4  
11. Finally, an injunction preventing Pierson from displaying the Photographs
or offering to sell the Photographs should issue.  A permanent injunction is an
appropriate remedy for copyright infringement if there is a threat of continuing
violations and an injunction is a reasonable means of preventing future infringement. 
MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 1993); 17
U.S.C. § 502.  Because inadvertent computer errors caused infringement to occur on at
least two occasions since 2010, and there is a threat that similar errors could cause
further infringement, the Court concludes that an injunction should issue to ensure that
Pierson takes steps to prevent the kind of inadvertent computer errors discussed above
from causing future infringement.  
12. To the extent necessary, each of these conclusions of law may be deemed to
be a finding of fact.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court finds that
Pierson is liable to Rosen for copyright infringement, and awards Rosen $800 statutory
damages.  Additionally, Pierson, along with any of his agents, servants, employees,
affiliates, successors, or assigns, and any person or entity acting on their behalf or in
4 An award of attorney’s fees to Pierson is not warranted either—despite the fact that
Pierson prevailed on the issue of innocent infringement—because Pierson did not prevail
on the issue of liability, and Rosen’s position regarding innocent infringement was not
objectively unreasonable, particularly in light of the fact that multiple acts of infringement
occurred.  Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 614 (9th Cir. 2010) (“In
considering whether [to award fees pursuant to section 505], the court might consider (1)
the degree of success obtained; (2) frivolousness; (3) motivation; (4) the objective
unreasonableness of the losing party’s factual and legal arguments; and (5) the need, in
particular circumstances, to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.”).  
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concert or participation with them, is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
copying, displaying, distributing, marketing, licensing, offering to license, selling, or
offering to sell the Photographs or any prints of the Photographs.  Each side is to bear its
own costs and attorney’s fees.  
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 9, 2013
__________________________________
CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
United States District Judge
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